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Abstract
Recently, handheld devices have become one of the most pop-
ular computing tools. Although handheld devices are able to
perform anything that a PC can do, their lack of computing
power makes it next to impossible to perform some heavy
calculations. Hence it appears very useful to have a combi-
nation of a handheld with a PC, where the PC can perform
heavy calculations to assist the handheld. However, we must
be assured that the PC will not have learnt anything from
the interaction. In this paper, we show two schemes which
involve some server-aided computation where the server has
not learnt anything from the interaction with the handheld
device. The first scheme is to generate a strong prime num-
ber in a handheld, which can be used as a candidate for the
RSA algorithm. The second scheme is to allow the server
to behave as an authentication oracle on behalf of the hand-
held. The handheld will prepare a message that needs to be
authenticated by sending it to the server in a blinded form,
so that the server will not learn about the message. On the
other hand, the handheld will not learn about the server’s
secret.
1 Introduction
Handheld computers have become an important part of
our life. Currently, handheld computer can perform the
same operations as a normal personal computer (PC), but
it is more desirable as its small size means it fits in a pocket.
The tendency is for users to use handheld computers instead
of a laptop. Thus the real need is to make handheld com-
puters more useful for electronic commerce applications.
Connecting a handheld to a PC to help it to perform
some computations seems to be a reasonable attempt to al-
low the handheld to have some additional computing power.
The PC helps the handheld to perform some computations,
which finally will be learnt by the handheld. In this sce-
nario, there is a new security issue, due to the PC involved
in the calculation. In the ideal case, the PC is trusted
and hence there will be no security problems. However,
due to its nature, a handheld is normally carried around
and it seems to be unreasonable to assume that it can al-
ways find its trusted PC partner. Therefore, performing a
computation with an untrusted PC has become a new and
challenging problem, which recently has been addressed by
several researchers (for example [2]).
Currently, the algorithm that is widely used to support
electronic commerce is RSA [12]. Basically, the RSA algo-
rithm can be used as an encryption algorithm or a digital
signature. A practical example of using RSA algorithm is
the SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) algorithm (which is basi-
cally an authentication mechanism followed by an encryp-
tion algorithm), which is used to protect an on-line trans-
action on the Internet. RSA has become very popular in
the practical world, with the introduction of Public Key
Infrastucture (PKI).
The main security feature of the RSA algorithm is the
size of the key. It is well-known that an RSA algorithm
with a short key is insecure [16]. According to [7], the
acceptable RSA key size is 1881 bits, to make it secure till
the year 2020. Delfs and Knebl [5, 15] and others have
argued that the prime numbers used in the RSA algorithm
must be strong prime numbers.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the problem of server-aided com-
putation for a handheld device, where the server is un-
trusted. There are two main cases that we would like to
address. In the first case, the untrusted server performs
some computations for the handheld, but all the inputs are
obtained from the handheld. In other words, the server
does not provide any additional input to the interaction. It
is desirable that the server should not learn anything from
the interaction at the end of the protocol. In the second
case, the untrusted server will give an additional input to
the computation. However, this input should not be learnt
by the handheld. On the other hand, the input that is given
by the handheld should not be learnt by the server.
We would like to address these two types of server-aided
computations by presenting two distinct schemes.
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The aim of the first scheme is to generate strong prime
numbers to be used in the RSA algorithm. As noted in [2],
generating a 1024 bit RSA key on a handheld device can
take as long as 15 minutes, and it will drain the battery of
the handheld. The obvious solution is to allow the hand-
held to communicate with a desktop or server and have the
server generate the key. Then the key can be downloaded
to the handheld. In [2], Boneh, Modadugu and Kim have
considered performing this computation with the help of an
untrusted server. However, their solution only allows gener-
ation of an unbalanced RSA key, which makes it impractical
(for example, an unbalanced RSA scheme cannot be used
to generate a digital signature). In this paper, we propose
a secure scheme that allows us to construct a strong prime
number in the handheld.
In the second scheme, we allow the server to become an
authentication oracle which can provide a message authen-
tication code for a given message by the handheld. The
purpose of the protocol is to allow the handheld to send a
blinded message m to the server, and the server will com-
pute f(m) = am + b in GF (p), for the secret values a and
b which are only known by the server. At the end of the
protocol, the handheld will learn about f(m) for his chosen
m, but will gain no knowledge about a and b involved in
the computation. On the other hand, the server will not
learn about m which is sent by the handheld. We note that
this problem is closely related to the question of “comput-
ing with encrypted data” [11]: Alice holds some input x,
Bob holds a function f , and Alice should learn f(x) in a
one-round protocol, where Alice sends to Bob an “encryp-
tion” of x, Bob computes f on the “encrypted” data x and
sends the result to Alice who “decrypts” this to f(x).
Our schemes are applicable to any type of low-power
handheld devices, for example: cellular phones, MP3 play-
ers, PDAs, etc. In our test-bed implementation, we use a
Pocket PC PDA, with 206 MHz, as an example of the low-
power handheld devices together with a Pentium IV PC
with 1.60 GHz. In our implementation, we use a serial con-
nection between the PDA and the PC to enable the com-
putation. We note that the connection can be extended,
for example using a socket communication. We record the
computation time together with the message-passing time
involved in the calculation. Changing the application layer
(for example, by using a WinSock implementation) will only
change the message-passing time without effecting the com-
putation time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we will review several previous related works
in this area. In section 3, we will review some of the tools
which will be used in our proposed schemes. In section 4,
we will describe the first scheme which enables the handheld
to construct a strong prime number and outline its security
considerations. In section 5, we will present the second
scheme which allows the handheld and the untrusted server
to collaboratively produce a message authentication code
for a given message m. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Notation: The length of a number p is the length of its
binary representation and is denoted by |p|2. The notation
a ∈R G means that a is selected randomly from the group
G.
2 Related Works
In this section, we review several previous works which
are related to our discussion.
2.1 Boneh, Modadugu and Kim’s Unbalanced RSA
Keys Generation
The unbalanced RSA system was originally proposed by
Shamir in [13]. In this system, the modulus n is chosen
of the form n = pR, where p is a 512 bit prime and R
is a 4096 bit random number. This system relies on the
fact that in a 4096 bit random number, there must be a
prime factor of at least 512 bits long (the probability that
it does not have such a factor is less than 1/224). Therefore,
the resulting modulus n is as hard to factor as a standard
modulus n = pq. We omit the description about encryption
and decryption in this system and refer the reader to [13]
for a more detailed account.
In [2], Boneh et al. proposed a scheme to generate an
unbalanced RSA keys with the help of an untrusted server.
They provided two schemes in their paper, with one or two
untrusted servers involved. However, we note that the use
of two untrusted servers in their scheme is impractical due
to the assumption that the untrusted servers will not col-
lude and share the information they have learnt. We also
note that the unbalanced RSA scheme cannot be used to
provide digital signatures [2, 13].
3 Tools
3.1 Gordon’s Strong Prime Number Generation
In [6], Gordon proposed a simple method to find a strong,
random, large prime of a given number of bits. By defini-
tion, a strong prime p is a prime number satisfying
• p = 1 (mod r)
• p = s− 1 (mod s)
• r = 1 (mod t)
where r, s and t are all large, random primes of a given
number of bits. We will incorporate his method in our first
scheme.
3.2 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is the ubiquitous tool in secure
computation. The concept of OT was introduced by Rabin
[8]. In this scheme, there are two polynomial time parties,
Alice and Bob. Alice sends a bit to Bob in such a way
that with 1/2 probability Bob will receive nothing and 1/2
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probability Bob will receive the same bit. Alice does not
have any knowledge which event has happened. Since then,
Rabin’s idea has attracted a lot of attention, where the most
notable advance is one-out-of-two OT (also known as all-
or-nothing disclosure of secrets [3]), denoted as OT 21 . This
definition can be extended to OT n1 , by executing n instances
of OT 21 [9].
The OT 21 is illustrated as follows. In the following in-
teraction, Bob is the sender and Alice is the receiver. Al-
ice’s private input is a bit c and Bob’s private inputs are
a0, a1 ∈ G. Common inputs are p and g, where g is the
generator in Zq .
1. Bob chooses δ ∈R G and sends δ to Alice.




, and sends β0, β1 to Bob.
3. Bob verifies whether β0β1
?
= δ, and aborts if not. Oth-
erwise, he chooses r0, r1 ∈R Zq, computes (e0, f0) =
(gr0 , a0β
r0
0 ) and (e1, f1) = (g
r1 , a1β
r1
1 ) and sends
(e0, f0, e1, f1) to Alice.





4 Strong Prime Numbers Generation
in a Secure Server Aided Computa-
tion
In this section, we describe our method to generate a
strong prime number in a handheld with the help of an un-
trusted server. The implementation is done with a Pocket
PC PDA connected to a PC via a serial connection, as
shown in Figure 1. Our method uses the idea of [2] and [6].
We describe the method in two stages: the primality test
algorithm and strong prime generation.
PDA
Serial Connection
Figure 1. Test-bed Architecture for Strong Prime
Generation
4.1 Primality Test Algorithm
We incorporate the method in [2] to determine whether
a number is a prime or not. The idea is to compute g(p−1)/2
(mod p) to test whether p is prime by realizing the fact that
if g(p−1)/2 = ±1 (mod p), where g is a random value in
{1, · · · , p − 1}, then p is a prime with overwhelming prob-
ability [10]. The algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 4.1,
where the handheldH performs a test to determine whether
p is a 512 bit prime number.
Algorithm 4.1: Test Prime(p)
1.Hgenerates a 512 bit candidate p that is not
divisible by small primes. We require that
p ≡ 3 mod 4.
2.H generates a 4096 bit random number R.
3.H picks a random 160 bit r.
4.H picks a random 512 bit a.
5.H computes z ← r + a(p− 1)/2
6.H computes N ← pR
7.H sends (N , g, z) to the server S.
8.S computes X ← gz (mod N ).
9.S sends X back to H.
10.H computes Y ← gr (mod p).
11.H verifies whether X
?
= ±Y (mod p). If not, then
repeat Step 1. Otherwise, continue with step 12.
12.H runs a probabilistic primality test to verify that
p is prime. If so, the algorithm has finished with a
prime p.
To verify the soundness of the algorithm, p is prime if
and only if X = ±Y, i.e. gr+a(p−1)/2 = ±gr (mod p). The
test will fail with overwhelming probability if p is not prime
[10]. Having the primality test algorithm as above, we pro-
ceed with the strong prime number generation algorithm in
the next section.
We note that the algorithm used in the above interac-
tion is a probabilistic algorithm. Employing a determinis-
tic algorithm, such as the one that is recently proposed by
Agrawal, Kayal and Saxena [1], will eliminate step 12.
4.2 Strong Prime Number Generation
We follow the idea of [6] to produce a strong prime num-
ber. Firstly, we need to find two odd prime numbers, r and
s, and apply Theorem 4.1 of [6].
Theorem 4.1 If r and s are odd primes, then prime p
satisfies
p ≡ 1 (mod r) ≡ s− 1 (mod s)
if p is of the form p = u(r, s) + krs where
u(r, s) ≡ (sr−1 − rs−1) (mod rs)
and k is an integer.
Proof: To prove this, we need to review Fermat’s Theorem
which states that if p is a prime that does not divide x, then
xp−1 = 1 (mod p). Since r and s are distinct primes, they
cannot divide one another and we obtain
sr−1 ≡ 1 (mod r)
rs−1 ≡ 1 (mod s)
Moreover,
sr−1 ≡ 0 (mod s)
rs−1 ≡ 0 (mod r)
krs ≡ 0 (mod r)
≡ 0 (mod s)
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Now, by definition
p ≡ u(r, s) + krs
≡ (sr−1 − rs−1) (mod rs) + krs
For any integers p, q and r, if p = q then p = q (mod r).
Applying p (mod r) to the above equation, we obtain
p ≡ ((sr−1 − rs−1) (mod rs) + krs) (mod r)
≡ sr−1 − rs−1 + krs (mod r)
≡ 1− 0 + 0 (mod r)
≡ 1 (mod r)
Using the same argument, applying p (mod s) to the same
equation, we obtain
p ≡ ((sr−1 − rs−1) (mod rs) + krs) (mod s)
≡ sr−1 − rs−1 + krs (mod s)
≡ 0 − 1 + 0 (mod s)
≡ −1 (mod s)
≡ s− 1 (mod s)

Because r and s are odd, then rs is odd, and krs is
alternatively odd or even, with increasing k. Since all our
interest is in odd prime numbers, it is convenient to consider
p to be of the form
p0 + 2krs
where if u(r, s) is odd then p0 = u(r, s), otherwise p0 =
u(r, s)+ rs. Since 2krs is even for all k, p0 +2krs is always
odd. Based on this discussion, we develop our algorithm to
generate a strong prime number in handheld with the help
of an untrusted PC as shown in Algorithm 4.2.
Algorithm 4.2: Strong Prime(p)
1. Call Test Prime(s)









r← kt + 1
if Test Prime(r)
then Finish← True







7. if (u (mod 2))
then p0 ← u









p← p0 + 2krs
if Test Prime(p)
then Finish← True
k← k + 1
until Finish
11. return (p)
In the above algorithm, we incorporate the function
Test Prime which was developed earlier. This function re-
quires an interaction with the untrusted server, but it will
not leave any knowledge for the server after the interaction.
4.3 Security Consideration
The security of our scheme relies on the function
Test Prime, which requires an interaction with the un-
trusted server S. From the interaction, S learns the value
z = a(p− 1) + r, but z is a random-looking 1024 bit value
which contains some information about p. The best known
algorithm for revealing p from z requires 2r/2 modular ex-
ponentiations [2] and due to the choice of r, the algorithm
has security of approximately 280. Overall, we can claim
that our algorithm is as secure as the algorithm proposed
in [2]. If the scheme in [2] can be compromised, then our
scheme can be broken. The full details of the proof will
appear in the full version of this paper.
4.4 Improvement
We note that to generate a normal RSA modulus, the
handheld is required to perform two consecutive processes
as described above. We can speed up the computation
by employing two different servers, which are connected
through TCP/IP connection. The architecture is shown in
Figure 2. Using this architecture, the speed is improved by





Figure 2. Strong Prime Generation with the Help
of Two Servers
4.5 Implementation
We have implemented the algorithms proposed in this
paper in a Pocket PC PDA with 206 MHz, together with
its serial connection to a PC. We incorporate Shoup’s NTL
(Number Theory Library) [14] in our implementation. The
result of the implementation is as follows.
Using the first configuration, we obtain the following
result.
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Process Time Elapsed (msec)
Message Passing 31




By replacing the configuration with the second architec-
ture, we can speed up the process by 1.5 times.
5 Authentication Oracle Computation:
An Application of Server-Aided
Computation
In this section, we outline the second application of a
server-aided computation. We note that this approach is
similar to [4]. In this application, the server keeps two
secret numbers, namely a and b, and whenever it accepts
a message m, it will produce the authenticated tag which
is f(m) ≡ am + b (mod p) in GF (p). The purpose of the
protocol is as follows. The handheld H will send a message
m to the server S, and S will compute f(m) and sends it
back to H. However, we require the following.
• At the end of the protocol, S should not learn about
m.
• At the end of the protocol, H should not learn about
a and b.
Intuitively, the basic idea is as follows. We assume that
both parties agree that the computations are done over
GF (p), for some prime p. Let |p|2 denote the size of p in
binary. For simplicity, we assume that |a|2 ≈ |m|2 ≈ |p|2.
This can be achieved by using some trailing 0s padding if in
fact |a|2 < |p|2, for instance. Represent a as its binary nota-










i−1. The idea is to allow S to re-
ceive mj , j ∈ |p|2, if ai = 1, i ∈ |p|2, in a secret way. This
is obtained by having H prepare the pair (ri, ri + mi) for a
random number ri and having S obtain what he wants via
OT 21 . When S knows that aj is 1, j ∈ |p|2, it will retrieve
ri+mi. Otherwise, it will retrieve ri. Then, it will multiply
it with aj . In conclusion, S will receive am+r. The process





(aijmij + rij) = am+ r.
Finally, S will add the result with b to make it am + b + r




to obtain am + b. The complete protocol is illustrated in
Algorithm 5.1. In this protocol, the computation is done in
GF (p).
Algorithm 5.1: Protocol(H and S)
1. H prepares the pairs (ri, ri + mi).
2. For each pair (ri, ri + mi),Sperforms an
independent OT 21 with H.
3. S sends am + b + r to H.
4. H subtracts it with
∑
i∈|p|2
ri to reveal am + b.
Lemma 5.1 Protocol 5.1 is correct when both parties fol-
low the protocol correctly.







ri can be easily subtracted to obtain am+ b.
In fact, in step 3, H receives b +
∑
i∈|p|2
(aimi + ri), which




Lemma 5.2 Protocol 5.1 is secure against the untrusted
server.
Proof: The security of the protocol relies on a secure
OT 21 . The server S will not learn the value m that H sent
because it has been randomized by r. On the other hand,
H will not learn a and b in the protocol. 
Lemma 5.3 This protocol is secure for one-round interac-
tion.
Proof: We note that at the end of the protocol H knows
y = am + b (mod p), for his choice of m. Knowing a pair
of (m,y) in the above equation will not allow H to deduce
the value of a and b, because there are exactly p different
(a′, b′), where a′, b′ ∈R GF (p), which satisfy the equation
with equal probability. However, if H runs the protocol for
a second time, with the same set of a and b from s, then he
will obtain the following equations:
y1 ≡ am1 + b (mod p)
y2 ≡ am2 + b (mod p)
for m1 6= m2 and y1 6= y2. Clearly, the rank of the above
equation is 2, which will allow H to reveal a unique solution.
Therefore, the protocol cannot be used for more than one
interaction. An extension to a1m
n +a2m
n−1 + · · ·+an will
allow it to be used for multiple rounds. 
5.1 Implementation
We also implemented the second scheme in a Pocket PC
PDA. The result is as follows.
Process Time Elapsed (msec)
Message Passing
between PC and PDA:
|p|2 ≈ 512 bits 516





6 Conclusions and Further Works
We have shown two distinct applications that involve an
untrusted server which enable a low-power device, such as a
handheld computer, to perform some heavy computations.
The applications that we have chosen show two different
important features of a server-aided computation, which in
one case, the server does not provide any extra information,
and in other case, the server uses additional information. In
both applications, the server will not learn anything from
the interaction, but the client will learn the result of the
computation without revealing the server’s secret. We have
done some experiments to show that the applications are
feasible in a Pocket PC PDA, which is an example of a
low-power device.
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